Abstract: While distribution conflicts over natural resources were central to the debates on a New International Economic Order, during the last decades the specific distribution conflicts surrounding natural resource exploitation no longer have been at the core of international law. In this paper I trace the developments in the relationship between international law and resource distribution conflicts. I first argue that the New International Economic Order favored the political resolution of distribution conflicts over natural resources and envisaged international distribution conflicts to be addressed by the political organs of international institutions within legal procedures Second, I show how the NIEO was surpassed by a different order that relied largely on the market as a distribution mechanism for raw materials and how international institutions and international law played a crucial role in the establishment of this order by promoting the privatization of natural resource exploitation and protecting foreign direct investment and trade. With reference to the copper industry in Zambia I thirdly illustrate how international investment law, and more broadly international economic law, is shaping (and affecting the resolution of) not only distribution conflicts between, but also within States. I conclude with a call for a renewed focus on an international law of resource conflicts to allow for their political resolution given the countermoves we can observe with respect to international investment law and the persistence of (violent) conflicts over natural resource exploitation within States.
distribution conflicts surrounding natural resource exploitation no longer have been at the core of international law. Instead international law has played a significant role in the privatization of natural resource exploitation relegating questions of distribution to 'the market'. Yet, international law's stance on resource distribution conflicts may once more be changing and resource conflicts may soon move center stage again, given the growing demand by emerging economies for raw materials, the discontents triggered by the social and environmental costs of extraction projects mainly in poor, but increasingly also in rich countries, as well as an enhanced global awareness of planetary limitations and the destructive consequences of our ever increasing consumption of natural resources.
In this Chapter I trace the developments in the relationship between international law and resource distribution conflicts. The focus will be on the role of international economic law, and in particular international investment law, in displacing efforts to create a legal framework for the political resolution of distribution conflicts over natural resources with a market rationale of distribution which does not take account of the particularities of natural resource exploitation. I first argue that the New International Economic Order favored the political resolution of distribution conflicts over natural resources and envisaged international distribution conflicts to be addressed by the political organs of international institutions within legal procedures (II.). Second, I show how the NIEO was surpassed by a different order that relied largely on the market as a distribution mechanism for raw materials and how international institutions and international law played a crucial role in the establishment of this order by promoting the privatization of natural resource exploitation and protecting foreign direct investment and trade (III.). With reference to the copper industry in Zambia I thirdly illustrate how international investment law, and more broadly international economic law, is shaping (and affecting the resolution of) not only distribution conflicts between, but also within States (IV.). I conclude with a call for a renewed focus on an international law of resource conflicts allowing for their political resolution given the countermoves we can observe with respect to international investment law and the persistence of (violent) conflicts over natural resource exploitation within States (V.).
II. The New International Economic Order: Political Resolution of Distribution Conflicts over Natural Resources
The New International Economic Order -which the newly independent States, organized in the G77, sought to establish after WWII -can be interpreted to exhibit a preference for the political resolution of natural resource conflicts. With the establishment of the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources it clearly allocated the right to dispose over natural resource wealth to the State within whose territory natural resources are located. Sovereignty over natural resources includes the right of States to exclude other States from access to their extractive resources. 3 As concerns internal decisions whether or not to exploit natural resources, how to exploit natural resources and how to share the benefits and burdens of natural resource exploitation, permanent sovereignty over natural resources may be interpreted to require such decisions to be the outcome of democratic processes. The New International Economic
Order not only allocated disposal rights to resource States and their peoples, it also addressed questions of international distribution conflicts which the 3 On modifications of sovereignty over natural resources in particular by international environmental law see ibid 231 et seq.
principle of permanent sovereignty -by its primary allocation of disposal rights over territorial resource wealth to individual States -potentially exacerbated.
International Commodity Agreements were to provide legal frameworks for the political resolution of such international distribution conflicts.
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources as a Political Concept
With decolonization the conflicting positions between industrialized countries, many dependent on imports of raw materials and oil, and newly independent resource-exporting States became apparent in debates within the United Nations on permanent sovereignty over natural resources. Under colonialism the imperial/European international law had provided a justification (based on the colonies' inferior status attributed to them by international law) to the imperial powers and their corporations for the exploitation of natural resources in the colonies. 4 With political independence, however, the formerly dependent territories became the imperial powers' sovereign equals and concomitantly could assert a right to territorial sovereignty, including sovereignty over their natural resources. Since the early 1950s the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources was formulated in a number of General Assembly resolutions. 5 General Assembly Resolution 1803 of 1962 qualifies the principle as follows:
The right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources must be exercised in the interest of their national development and of the well-being of the people of the state concerned. 6 This formulation indicates that permanent sovereignty is to protect the collective autonomy of the resource States' population and has to be exercised through politics. This interpretation is supported by the international human rights covenants that link permanent sovereignty over natural resources to the right to decisions on the exploitation of natural resources will always need to be linked to democratic procedures if they are to be an expression of self-determination.
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As natural resource exploitation is frequently highly capital-and skill-intensive many resource-rich developing countries would not have been able to exploit their natural resources without the help of foreign direct investment (FDI). In order to attain greater economic independence they combined insistence on permanent sovereignty over natural resources with claims for substantial financial assistance by public lenders as well as transfer of technological knowhow. 13 Support specifically for the economic exploitation of natural resources was to be provided by a Common Fund for Commodities. 
International Legal Procedures to Address International Resource

Conflicts
While permanent sovereignty over natural resources laid the foundation for the argument that national decisions about natural resource exploitation must be an expression of collective autonomy and are to be the subject of (domestic) Aiming not only at political autonomy, but also greater economic independence the new States frequently nationalized these corporations. They argued that sovereignty should not only entail a right to ownership, but also a right to nationalize foreign extraction companies. While consensus could also be reached on this position, the industrialized countries did not agree to a right to 29 Stephen place. While at first sight these agreements appear as one-sided (and are frequently interpreted to be) they also posit (like the arbitral awards mentioned above) that in order to benefit from international protection, foreign direct investment must be beneficial to economic development. Under such an interpretation transnational corporations are becoming agents of development. This can be interpreted to mean that distribution conflicts are to be solved by the market or rather that distribution conflicts that would require political resolution will not arise if only the market is left to operate freely and transparently within a framework of binding international law rules.
IV. How International (Investment) Law Shapes Distribution Conflicts over Natural Resources: The Case of Zambia
The example of Zambia illustrates the shift towards privatized natural resource exploitation and how it was promoted by the international financial institutions. It also reveals that the win-win scenario which provides the legitimation for the promotion and protection of foreign direct investment in Zambia, like in many other resource-rich developing countries, has remained unfulfilled. Finally, it
indicates how the privatization of natural resource exploitation has released the importing States from responsibility while at the same time serving their interest in resource security and how international law has come to restrict the policy space available to resource States to address internal distribution conflicts.
Privatization of Natural Resource Exploitation in Zambia
The Republic of Zambia is a resource-rich country. On its territory exist large deposits of copper, moreover there are known deposits of emerald, gold, zinc and diamonds. Many of the mineral deposits are concentrated in the Copperbelt region on the border of Zambia and The Democratic Republic of Congo. In 2011
Zambia was the world's seventh largest producer of copper, the second largest producer of cobalt (a by-product of copper production) and provided one fifth of the global supply of emeralds. 51 The first copper mine started business in 1928 
The Unfulfilled Promise of Privatized Natural Resource Exploitation --The Case of Zambia Continued
Since the economic reforms demanded by the International Financial
Institutions and including privatization, trade liberalization and facilitation of administrative procedures, Zambia is internationally praised for its investorfriendliness. 62 The current prosperity of the Zambian copper industry is generally attributed to privatization and foreign direct investment. According to the IMF the mining sector due to private investment and positive prospects for copper prices will continue to play a key role in the countries' economic development. 63 between 10 and 20 years and were to be modifiable only by mutual consent of the parties to the agreement. They also provided that conflicts concerning the Development Agreements could be referred to international arbitration. economic growth and economic growth in turn will benefit the population through the creation of further jobs and business opportunities. The international financial institutions are not oblivious to the fact that economic growth does not automatically 'trickle' down. In order to ensure that assistance and investments ultimately leads to poverty reduction and well-being of the population they, inter alia, advocate for 'good governance' in developing countries. 84 The reliance by importing States on FDI to ensure access to raw materials has two important side-effects. First, the importing State that relies on FDI for access to natural resources no longer engages in international cooperation to specifically address distribution conflicts. As a consequence, and that is the 
V. Towards an International Conflicts Law of Natural Resources Exploitation
In recent years distribution conflicts seem to be moving again to the center of attention of international law and politics. This development can be explained by two reasons in particular. First, resource States are increasingly dissatisfied with the current international legal framework and attempt to regain control over the exploitation of natural resources on their territory. Second, the governments of the emerging economies, in particular China, call into question the viability of continued reliance by Western industrialized countries on the market to secures their access to natural resources. In light of these developments we should refocus attention on political conflict resolution procedures.
The Return of Distribution Conflicts over Natural Resource Exploitation to International Law
The promise of win-win through privatized natural resource exploitation frequently has remained unfulfilled and has led to discontent with FDI resulting in what is often being termed 'resource nationalism'. 91 Zambia's total public external debt. 102 In return for such assistance which is frequently linked to particular development projects, China is given access to natural resource exploitation in the recipient country. 103 As a reaction to proactive resource politics of the BRICs, governments, which like the German government long ceased to be actively involved in trade in natural resources, and the European Union attempt to secure access to natural resources by means of international law. While Germany is concluding so-called bilateral resource partnerships 104 the EU concentrates on the prohibition of export restrictions. 
Re-Politicizing Resource Conflicts in International Law
The developments described in the previous section indicate that distribution conflicts will not go away, but likely will become more severe. Their equitable resolution will require the diverging interests that give rise to these conflicts to be openly acknowledged and represented in conflict resolution procedures.
Such procedures must aim to re-politicize resource conflicts. For guidance on such a re-politicization we might revisit the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources and the NIEO's International Commodity Agreements. conditionality as they may not interfere with the political systems of their members. 107 If a State decides, on the basis of a democratic process, to (legally) nationalize the extractive sector then it should receive adequate technical and financial assistance so it can implement this decision and thus realize its right to permanent sovereignty over natural resources. That such assistance may pay out in terms of economic development is supported by the fact that payments of the G8 for resource imports from developing countries by far exceed official development assistance. 
b) International Institutions and Procedures to Address International Distribution Conflicts
Due to the territoriality of natural resources located within national jurisdictions delocalization can never be complete and probably for a long time to come the democratic procedures necessary to realize the right to permanent sovereignty over natural resources will have better chances to be implemented on the State or the sub-State level than transnationally. As a consequence conflicts between
States over access will persist. To 'perfect the market' for natural resources does not appear a feasible option to overcome such conflicts, given that many populations opt for stricter governmental control over natural resources exploitation. In this situation international cooperation that takes into account diverging interests of exporting and importing States will be the only feasible and legitimate way to protect importing States' interests in supply security. The
International Commodity Agreements provide examples of international procedures that take account of both the sovereign equality of States and the diverging interests of resource-importing and resource-exporting States. A Commodity Organization could establish a framework for mutually beneficial cooperation that on the one hand provides assistance to exporting States to realize their permanent sovereignty over natural resources and that on the other hand promotes supply security of importing States, e.g. through the conclusion of long-term resource trade agreements. Finally, such an organization could provide a forum for a re-politicized debate on the international protection of investments and the balancing of development and investment concerns in the resources sector.
